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Abstract
A great deal of theoretical effort in multiagent learning involves either embracing or avoiding the inherent symmetry between the
problem and the solution. Regret minimization is an approach to the prescriptive, non-cooperative goal that explicitly breaks this
symmetry, but, since it makes no assumptions about the adversary, it achieves only limited guarantees. In this paper, we consider a
hierarchy of goals that begins with the basics of regret minimization and moves towards the utility guarantees achievable by agents
that could also guarantee converging to a game-theoretic equilibrium.
© 2007 Published by Elsevier B.V.
1. Introduction
The prescriptive, non-cooperative goal set forth in Shoham et al. is to design intelligent agents that perform well
in the presence of other intelligent agents. Much of the research and analysis in this domain involves either bypassing
the circularity of this objective (as in regret minimization) or embracing it (as in equilibrium or self-play analyses).
In this paper, we will try to unravel this objective by consciously breaking the symmetry between the agent, whose
behavior we can prescribe, and the environment (other players1) over which we have no control. Much of the regret
minimization literature also speaks from this perspective: in fact, concepts like calibration have origins in predicting
the weather, hardly a multiagent problem!
Nonetheless, without making some assumptions about an agent’s environment, there are some guarantees that
simply cannot be achieved, such as convergence to the set of Nash or correlated equilibria. This observation has
prompted others in the past to study self-play, where the environment is assumed to exhibit the same behavior as the
agent. We believe that self-play is an example of a restriction upon the environment that limits the applicability of
many results. The fact that an agent performs well in self-play says nothing about how that agent might interact with
humans or agents designed by others.
Instead, we believe a more useful focus is on characterizations of environments that can be made in an agent-
independent way, as described below.
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work on and how well they work on that set. Or, to focus on the set of environments apart from an agent, three relevant
attributes of an environment class come to mind:
• Workability: What type of guarantees can be achieved against the class? By definition, agents care about utility
(although how they should go about earning utility is a matter of some debate). In this paper, for concreteness, we
focus on a particular form of utility guarantees, and then discuss the environment sets in which it is possible to
achieve those guarantees.
• Breadth: How broad is the class? As MAL researchers, we wish to develop agents that can achieve guarantees for
as broad an environment class as possible.
Consider the result that no-internal regret2 agents [2,3] (we call this set ANIR) converge (in the empirical frequency
of joint actions) to the set of correlated equilibria when playing against any environment that is no-internal regret
(we call this set ENIR). An interesting question arises: what if the environment is not no-internal regret? Moreover,
what if we only cared about getting the utility of a stationary correlated equilibrium instead of converging to the
equilibrium itself?
For instance, we could add to ENIR (although not to ANIR) those environments that play stationary Nash equilibria,
and the NIR agents would still get a high utility.3 Oddly, we could not add altruistic environments that play as
if their opponent’s utilities were their own and have no-internal regret: for instance, if the environment has a
dominant strategy, it might lead to easy cooperation, whereas both players even with identical utilities might have
a difficult time making a common choice. Thus, as we expand this environment set, not only do we get a stronger
guarantee, but we also learn more about what makes the original result work in the first place.
• Saliency: Are there agents in the class that perform well on the class? Are there agents that could be considered in-
telligent? Throughout our description of environment sets, we avoid circularity by not addressing saliency directly.
However, we hope to find the environments that are ultimately derived (using the principles of workability and
breadth) to be a superset of the environments we consider intelligent, or at least to overlap significantly. Whether
this outcome prevails or not will be the primary measure of the success of our proposed agent/environment split.
Normally, when researchers formulate an environment class, they either consider the set of all environments or
they begin with some concept of saliency (such as self-play).4 Between these two extremes in multiagent learning—
guarantees that can be achieved in every environment and guarantees that can be achieved in self-play—there lies a
hierarchy:
Definition 1. A hierarchy of prescriptive goals is:
(1) A hierarchy of environment sets {S1, . . . , Sk}, each one contained in its predecessor.
(2) A hierarchy of guarantees {G1, . . . ,Gk},
such that there exists a single agent that, for every i, satisfies Gi with every environment in Si .
In the large margin structural risk-minimization literature, there is a hierarchy of hypothesis spaces, with large
margin hypotheses nearer to the top of the hierarchy and smaller margin hypotheses nearer to the bottom. Assume
that the data agrees with some hypothesis, given a supervised-learning problem. If it agrees only with a small margin
hypothesis, then a large amount of training data is required for good generalization performance. This guarantee
2 They are referred to as no-regret agents by Foster and Vohra [2]. We use the terminology of Greenwald and Jafari [4] to distinguish no-internal
and no-external regret.
3 In particular, the agents in ANIR would still CEV work with the environments that play stationary Nash equilibria (see Section 3). However,
the empirical joint action frequency might no longer converge to the set of correlated equilibria. Moreover, the agents that play stationary Nash
equilibria do not work with ENIR, because that the ENIR algorithms will converge to a best response to a Nash equilibrium, not a Nash equilibrium
itself.
4 Another popular choice is the set of stationary environments. The advantage of this set is that the stationarity assumption is made in classification
tasks, and therefore supervised-learning techniques can carry over. However, there is no reason to believe that intelligent agents should exhibit
stationary behavior. They, too, should learn.
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the generalization performance is excellent with only a few training examples. A single algorithm—a support-vector
machine—can achieve all of these guarantees. If one such algorithm did not exist, then this hierarchy of generalization
guarantees and hypotheses spaces could only be viewed as a collection of goals, and could not be interpreted as a
single, overarching goal. Similarly, we view our proposed hierarchy of prescriptive goals as a single, overarching goal
for multiagent learning.
Our perspective is similar to the objectives specified by Bowling [1], who suggests that agents should be designed
to achieve two different guarantees (convergence to Nash equilibrium and best response) against two different classes
of environments (self-play and stationary). Even more closely related to what we are proposing here are two results
about no-internal regret agents: namely, that they minimize internal regret in an arbitrary environment and that their
empirical joint action frequency converges to the set of correlated equilibria. In this work, we will focus on the
implications upon utility of these two guarantees, and we will analyze whether a broader class of environments can
be handled at each level.
It is not only the theoretical elegance of structural risk minimization that has excited machine-learning researchers;
what is most impressive is its practical implications. The advantage to an empiricist of using such a technique is
that it allows her to give a soft boundary on what she expects to happen. Thus, an algorithm can use the data to
decide exactly how accurate the empiricist’s assumptions are and to relax them as necessary to deal with real-world
occurrences. Whether through regret methods or the hierarchies described here, soft assumptions which, if true, result
in a performance guarantee, but, if false, do not preclude the algorithm from performing reasonably well,5 are useful
for developing agents that perform well in practice.
2. A model of interaction: Repeated bimatrix games
In this paper, we restrict our attention to repeated bimatrix games, as they are sufficient to model many of the
fundamental issues in multiagent learning.6 Moreover, we assume that the game, including its utility functions, is
known to both players. Although this assumption will bias our discussion, we believe it is a good place to begin.
We will talk about a game G, which formally is a tuple (A1,A2, u1, u2), A1 being the actions for the first player,
A2 for the second, u1 :A1 × A2 → R and u2 :A1 × A2 → R the utilities for the first and second players, respectively.
We define SCE(G) to be the set of correlated equilibria of the single-shot variant of G and SNE(G) to be the set of
Nash equilibria of the single-shot variant of G. As usual, we will refer to the history of the game as h ∈ (A1 × A2)∞,
with ht being the joint action at round t .
We will refer to the first player and its behavior as the agent, and the second player and its behavior as the environ-
ment.
3. A utility guarantee as a goal
Before we discuss possible behaviors for agent and environment, we will fix a concept of what it means to perform
well. In a repeated bimatrix game, goals are often stated in terms of utility: best response, regret minimization, etc.
Because we are attempting to develop objectives first so that we can determine in which environments they can be
achieved later, we will choose a utility objective that is independent of the behavior of the environment or the agent
that produces this behavior.
Definition 2. Given a game G, and a real number v, an agent σ (G,v)-works with an environment ρ if, assuming the







u1(ht ) v. (1)
We say that ρ is (G,v)-workable.
5 An example of a soft assumption is: the true hypothesis has a large margin.
6 For instance, the bimatrix game formulation can represent arbitrary extensive-form games, and the notion of repetition facilitates learning.
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(2) The correlated equilibrium value (CEV) of a game G is the minimum value (to player 1) across the set of




(3) The Nash equilibrium value (NEV) of a game G is the minimum value (to player 1) across the set of Nash




Fact 1. The NEV of a game is no less than the CEV, and the CEV is no less than the safe value.
Fact 2. There is a game where the NEV exceeds the CEV, and a game where the CEV exceeds the safe value.
In other words, an agent works (at a certain level v) if the average utility eventually approaches or exceeds v. Let
us relate this concept to others in game theory.
(1) If an agent σ plays a best response to an environment ρ in a game G (in terms of immediate utility on every
round), then σ (G, safe(G))-works with ρ.
(2) If an agent σ minimizes external regret [5] in G, for any environment ρ, then σ (G, safe(G))-works with ρ.
(3) If an agent σ minimizes internal regret in a game G, for any environment ρ that minimizes internal regret, σ
(G,CEV(G))-works with ρ.
(4) If an agent σ is a best response to an environment ρ in a game G (in terms of immediate utility on every round),
and ρ is a best response to σ , then σ (G,NEV(G))-works with ρ.
From the first point, we note that a best response can be guaranteed to achieve only the safe value when facing
an arbitrary environment. From the fourth point, however, if the environment is such that it always plays a best
response as well, the (no smaller and possibly larger) Nash equilibrium value is achieved. Thus, the natural concepts
of “learnable” (i.e., like PAC-learnable or learnable in the statistical query model) do not apply to these domains,
because perfectly predicting the environment is not enough to guarantee good performance. The level of performance
achieved is contingent, in part, on properties of the environment itself. Moreover, most machine-learning research
focuses on learning independent and identically distributed sequences, or at most some stationary Markov process,
whereas the environments of interest here can themselves learn and are therefore likely to be more difficult to model.7
Observe that we have constructed a hierarchy: for a given game G, a given ρ, an agent σ that (G,NEV(G))
works with an environment ρ also (G,CEV(G)) works with ρ, and an agent σ that (G,CEV(G)) works with ρ also
(G, safe(G)) works with ρ. While it is a hierarchy of guarantees, these are guarantees on a single environment, not a
class. Therefore, we extend the concept of workable to sets.
Definition 3. Given a game G, and a real number v, an agent σ (G,v)-works with a class of environments C if for all
ρ ∈ C, σ (G,v)-works with ρ. C is said to be (G,v)-workable.
To connect this definition to the machine-learning literature, it is easiest to think of environment classes as hypoth-
esis classes. “Workable” is analogous to the concept of “learnable”.
Given a game G, the hierarchy of goals we consider here, while it is certainly not the only one possible, is:
7 We do not deny the fact that being able to predict the environment’s behavior is a powerful tool. It is quite possible that by formalizing these
environment classes, they may be used as the basis for priors of learning agents.
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(2) The agent (G,CEV(G))-works.
(3) The agent (G,NEV(G))-works.
The first two levels are the two guarantees about no-internal regret algorithms in a utility guarantee form. The third
represents the utilitarian part of a much discussed objective: converging to a stationary Nash equilibrium (in utility, at
least).
Throughout the remainder of the paper, we will focus on this hierarchy of guarantees, and investigate the hierarchy
of environment sets that matches it well. We call this goal hierarchy the Hierarchy of Equilibrium Utilities. In the
next section, we formalize the environment set that corresponds to this hierarchy. We give the full definition of this
hierarchy at the end of the next section.
4. Developing a hierarchy of environment sets
Let us begin with the broadest possible class—the set of all environments for S1, because there are agents that have
no internal regret in any environment.
It is natural to consider as the next environment class one that is (G,CEV(G))-workable. One likely candidate
would be the no-internal regret environments (NIR). Observe that an agent that can (G,CEV(G))-work with the NIR
environments could also be NIR with all environments. The existence of such an agent is an example of achieving a
hierarchy of prescriptive goals.
Now, let us forget about its origins, and consider the NIR environments as a hypothesis space. If we consider the
principal property of this set to be that it is (G,CEV(G))-workable, can we expand it to achieve a larger hypothesis
space/environment class?
This metaphor is quite crucial: when machine-learning researchers realize that they can broaden their horizons
virtually for free, they do so without hesitation. Such an expansion may involve hypotheses that are unlikely or even
downright nonsensical, but it is a small price to pay for incorporating additional hypotheses. In our work here and in
the work of others, most formally defined environment classes that are sufficiently broad will have both reasonable
and unreasonable environments. Arguably, the guiding principle of machine learning is to get the best bounds (or
practical performance) with the broadest hypothesis space. Correspondingly, a critical part of our theory here will
be the maximal (G,CEV(G))-workable sets: environment sets for which there exists no strict superset that is also a
(G,CEV(G))-workable set.
Now, there are two problems with such a concept, one technical and one philosophical:
(1) In general, it is not obvious that one such maximal set exists: it could be that one could always add one more
environment and still be (G,CEV(G))-workable, although we have not constructed such an example.
(2) By constructing a maximal set, we may go too far. For instance, it may be that some environments are work-
able only with agents whose first three actions are “left”, “right”, “right”, whereas other environments might be
workable only with agents that begin by choosing “right”, “left”, “left”. Thus, whereas we are trying to design a
canonical maximal set, we may find a plethora of maximal sets, not one environment class for which to develop
prescriptive agents.
Consider an example of this last point, a game where the utility functions are equal and each player has a strictly
dominant strategy. If one agent plays foolishly, then the other will also pay the penalty. It could be that an environment
will play its dominant strategy only if it sees a certain sequence of actions in the beginning, say “left”, “right”, “right”.
Otherwise, it will play a dominated action. Such a game may seem contrived, but it serves to highlight an issue that
exists but is more subtle in more ordinary games—an agent may choose to not play its dominant action for arbitrary
reasons.
Hence, if we want a general purpose class of environments, we may not wish it to be maximal, possibly enabling
an agent to focus on a peculiarity of a small subset of environments (even if the maximal set is much larger). Loosely
8 We include no-internal regret because it is stronger than (G, safe(G))-working and can still be applied to all environments.
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tion. More formally:
Definition 4. An environment ρ is in the canonical (G,v)-workable set if for every (G,v)-workable set S, S ∪ {ρ} is
also a (G,v)-workable set.
Suppose you have some agent σ that (G,v)-works with a set of environments S. If you add some element ρ from
the canonical (G,v)-workable set, then if your agent does not (G,v)-work with S ∪ {ρ}, there will be another agent
σ ′ that does. Therefore, given a workable set, adding an environment from the canonical set will not make the set
unworkable.
This canonical concept avoids those environments that force a particular line of play: if one environment requires
an agent to always go left, and the other to always go right, neither will be in the canonical set.
One final, more practical tweak to building workable sets is to build the hierarchy of goals from the bottom upwards.
For instance, we can say for a given existing hierarchy that there is a certain set of agents A that can satisfy all the
properties of that hierarchy. When we design higher levels of the hierarchy, we should restrict the agents we consider
included in this set to A, otherwise we will develop an unachievable set of goals.
Given a game G, we can design agents that have no-internal regret with all environments. However, it is not enough
to have a (G,CEV(G))-workable set at the next level. It must be (G,CEV(G))-workable with an NIR agent, otherwise
no agent will be able to satisfy both goals. Thus, we only consider environment sets to be (G,CEV(G))-workable if
they work with an agent that is NIR.
Definition 5. Given a game G, a tuple of goals (g1 . . . gk), a tuple of environment sets (S1 . . . Sk), an agent is
((g1 . . . gk), (S1 . . . Sk)) viable if for all i, it achieves guarantee gi with set Si . Given a new goal value v′ ∈ R, the
relative canonical set S′ with respect to ((g1, . . . , gk), (S1 . . . Sk)) is the set of all environments ρ such that for any set
S′ where S′ is (G,v′)-workable with a viable agent σ , there exists a viable agent σ ′ that (G,v′) works with S′ ∪ {ρ}.
One way to envision this construction is that we are creating a hierarchy from the bottom up, one level at a time.
Before we add a new environment to the highest level, we first make sure it does not interfere with our existing
structure.
Definition 6. The Hierarchy of Equilibrium Utilities is the hierarchy of guarantees:
(1) g1: the agent is no-internal regret.
(2) g2: the agent (G,CEV(G)) works.
(3) g3: the agent (G,NEV(G)) works.
and the hierarchy of environments:
(1) S1: all environments.
(2) S2: relative canonical (G,CEV(G)) set with respect to ((g1), (S1)).
(3) S3: relative canonical (G,NEV(G)) set with respect to ((g1, g2), (S1, S2)).
5. Salience
After a hierarchy is developed, one can measure its practicality in part by noticing where existing algorithms and
models of intelligence fit in. In particular, if one comes up with a hierarchy with no-internal regret environments near
the top, that would provide evidence that the classes are salient.
Another important aspect of salience involves the agents that actually achieve the hierarchy of goals. Are some of
them in the smallest environment classes? If they are, then an emergent (not deliberate) result follows: they achieve
the highest guarantee in the hierarchy in self-play.
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stationary Nash equilibrium environments are in S3.
Proof. Here, we prove the first result: the second result is derived similarly. The (g1, S1) viable agents are exactly the
NIR agents. Therefore, if an environment set is S′ (G,CEV(G)) workable with a viable agent σ , then σ being viable
is an NIR agent, and if ρ is an NIR environment, then σ (G,CEV(G)) works with ρ and therefore σ (G,CEV(G))
works with S′ ∪ {ρ}. This establishes that the environment set S2 is salient. 
One might also consider behaviors in the higher environment levels as candidate agents. These environments can
be lifted over the artificial divide we have constructed between agents and environments, and their performance as
agents can be analyzed.
6. A continuum of guarantees
Although CEV and NEV are the utility guarantees corresponding to existing guarantees of play, interesting utility
levels vary from game to game. This point brings up the challenge of how to design a hierarchy of environments for
the hierarchy of guarantees consisting of all utility guarantees for a game. More mathematical difficulties arise than
in the finite-guarantee case; nonetheless, such a hierarchy would be of interest for two reasons. First, this hierarchy
of goals could be construed as defining a new concept of rationality in the game. Second, if an agent achieved these
hierarchical goals, the ensuing behavior of a pair of these agents (one for each player) would yield a new type of
equilibrium.
7. Open problems
What we have presented here is a mostly framework to guide the development of multiagent-learning algorithms.
Nonetheless, there are several open mathematical problems that can be derived from the examples we give here. For
instance, the following prescriptive goals could be addressed:
Open Problem 8. Can an agent be constructed for any bimatrix game that satisfies all the goals in the Hierarchy of
Equilibrium Utilities?
Open Problem 9. Where do no-internal regret environments reside in the Hierarchy of Equilibrium Utilities for
different games? Are they always in the NEV-workable level of the hierarchy? Could no-internal regret agents CEV
work with the CEV-workable level of the hierarchy?
Open Problem 10. How do Bayesian techniques (such as fictitious play) fit into this framework? Where do they fit as
environments? As agents?
One could ask such questions about any technique that has been applied to bimatrix games in the past. Also, with
regards to saliency, there are two descriptive goals:
Open Problem 11. In the NEV-workable and CEV-workable environments, are there behaviors that would serve to
model humans?
Open Problem 12. Would the agents that work with these environment sets serve to model humans?
From a more philosophical perspective, questions could be posed about other hierarchies of guarantees besides the
Hierarchy of Equilibrium Utilities. One could also consider higher level guarantees, such as achieving a particular
utility quickly. For instance, one could develop an uncountably infinite set of environment classes depending upon
how quickly CEV(G) is approached.
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Some AI researchers have ideas about what human learning is like and design learning algorithms guided by their
ideas. Since our ideas of what human behavior is really like are much more vague than our ideas about how a car
moves or how light travels, this design process can easily go astray.
If we consider the prescriptive goal to be to design algorithms that work well with humans, the most natural solution
to this problem would be to develop a descriptive model of human behavior independent of attempting to solve any
prescriptive goals. This tack, however, requires us to first understand what learning could be like. Since humans are at
their very essence social animals, to model how they behave we must first understand what behaviors are relevant in
social environments, and then discover which of these best represents humans. However, this path returns us the very
essence of the prescriptive goal.
Thus, in the end we are left with a problem: to address descriptive goals in multiagent learning, we must first
address prescriptive goals, and to attack the prescriptive goals, we must first deal with the descriptive ones.
In this paper, we discussed how to bootstrap this process. We gave an example of a hierarchy of objectives for pre-
scriptive agents. These objectives were not meant to be indicative of what intelligence is, but rather what intelligence
can deal with. Thus, at the lowest level of this process, we consider the classes of behaviors (environments) against
which an objective can be achieved. Given this beginning, we can move naturally towards what intelligence is, and
then hopefully to a better understanding of human intelligence and, more generally, social intelligence.
The hypothesis of this paper is that an important aspect of multiagent learning is the development and understanding
of classes of agents that may not all be intelligent in and of themselves but can be “handled” by intelligent agents. We
believe that such an objective rests at the foundation of multiagent learning.
9. Conclusion
Often when multiagent-learning researchers consider a set of environments, they are guided by concerns of salience
and workability: i.e., they select an environment that seems intelligent and then try to build an agent to work with it,
tweaking agent and environment until some (hopefully) useful property emerges. What we would like to highlight that
is missing from this process is a desire for breadth. At the extreme, one can consider the set of all environments. While
some interesting guarantees (e.g., regret minimization) can be obtained under this assumption, one cannot derive a
blanket guarantee of utility (or achieve many other prescriptive goals) across all environments beyond the safe value.
The main point of this paper is that, when working on the prescriptive, non-cooperative agenda of multiagent
learning, there is a fundamental difference between the way one should consider algorithms one is designing and
algorithms one is facing. Whereas saliency is desirable in the algorithms one designs, the environments one considers
should be designed according to workability and breadth more than saliency. In particular, the perspective when
considering an agent and the perspective when considering an environment are asymmetric.
Hence, in this paper, we have argued for a hierarchy of prescriptive goals, analogous to the structural risk minimiza-
tion framework in binary classification. We believe that developing such a hierarchy of goals is crucial for grasping
the basic nature of social intelligence: i.e., the ability to interact effectively in a multiagent setting.
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